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Abstract
A simulation of U.S. corn production compares four environmental policies for controlling
agricultural nitrate pollution.  Public uncertainty about key economic parameters are considered. 
Results indicate that policy choice is sensitive to commodity programs and the public information
structure.  Agricultural research benefits are also sensitive to agricultural environmental policy
choices.
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Introduction
There is currently much interest in reducing nitrate pollution from agriculture.  This
interest is motivated by concerns for the health impacts of nitrate contamination of drinking water
and the ecological damages of increased nutrient levels in water bodies.  Economists have long
advocated the use of emission taxes and other emission-based economic instruments for efficient
control of environmental externalities (e.g. Bohm and Russell, 1985).  However, such instruments
are of limited utility for the control of nitrate pollution from agriculture because monitoring
emissions by source is impractical.  Alternatives that have received attention in the literature
include taxes and standards on excess nitrogen (defined as the difference between total nitrogen
applied in fertilizer and manure, plus nitrogen carry over, less the nitrogen taken up by  the crop),
ambient nitrate concentrations in water resources, and nitrogen fertilizer purchases or applications
(e.g., Griffin and Bromley, 1982; Huang and LeBlanc, 1994; Shortle and Dunn, 1986; Shortle and
Abler, 1994; Segerson, 1988; Stevens, 1988).  There is, however, little empirical analysis of the
implications of public uncertainty about benefits and costs for the choice of instruments.  Yet, it is
clear from the work of Weitzman (1974) and others (e.g Stavins, 1996) that uncertainty is a
critical factor in policy choices.  Instruments that can be designed to perform with equal efficiency
with perfect information (e.g., emissions taxes and standards), will in general perform unequally
when designed with imperfect information.
In this paper, we compare the performance of taxes and standards under public uncertainty
about the costs and benefits of nitrate pollution control in the production of corn using a
simulation model of aggregate U.S. corn production.  Public uncertainty is modeled here as
uncertainty by environmental regulators about such economic parameters as demand and input2
substitution elasticities, and the environmental costs of nitrate pollution, and also uncertainty
about environmental parameters, such as nitrate losses and delivery.  In addition, we explore the
impacts of learning on policy choices and performance.  All of these issues are considered with
and without traditional commodity programs.
Simulation Model
As in Weitzman’s and much of the subsequent work on policy choices under uncertainty,
the optimal form of a particular instrument, such as a linear tax on nitrate fertilizer, maximizes the
expected net benefits (producers’ plus consumer surplus from commodity production and
consumption less environmental damage costs) to society given the existing market structure and
government programs.  Transactions costs and distributional impacts aside, one instruments is
considered to be economically superior to another if the expected net benefit from its optimized
form exceeds the expected net benefit from the optimized form of the alternative.  Accordingly,
for this analysis, we must determine the fertilizer and excess nitrogen taxes and standards that
maximize expected net benefits.  In order to calculate the effect of information on policy choice,
we must also compute expected net benefits of information.
A partial market equilibrium model of the U.S. corn market is used to compute
equilibrium market prices and quantities.  Farmers are assumed to be price takers, but commodity
and input markets are distorted by deficiency payments and the acreage reduction program.  The
complete set of equations that make up the model include first-order conditions for profit
maximization, consumer demand for output, input supply, and constraints implied by market
clearing conditions.(xL)( x F )
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Production is modeled as a two-level nested CES production function (Sato, 1967).  The
key parameters of this functional form are the share parameters and elasticities of substitution
between inputs.  Following Abler and Shortle (1992), output is modeled as a function of a
composite mechanical input, M, and a composite biological input, B.  The mechanical input
provides power for planting and weeding while the biological input provides the nutrients and
environment for plant growth (Abler and Shortle, 1992).  The lower level production function
generates the composite inputs.  Inputs included are land  , fertilizer  , capital and labor. 
The mechanical input is a function of capital and labor.  However prices of these inputs are fixed
implying there is no change in the relative price within the nest and as such it has no effect on the
analysis.  The inputs are therefore aggregated into a single input,  .  The production function is
therefore given as  where   ,   are share
parameters,   is the elasticity of substitution between the mechanical and biological inputs, and
A is a scaling constant.  The biological input is a function of land   and fertilizer  ,
where   ,   are the share parameters,   the
elasticity of substitution between land and fertilizer, and K is a scaling constant.   The elasticity of
substitution between land and fertilizer and other parameters (output demand elasticity, land
supply elasticity and a runoff coefficient) introduced below are assumed to be unknown by policy
makers prior to the decision making process although their distributions are known.
All inputs except land are assumed to be supplied perfectly elastically.  In the short run,
supply responses are not perfectly elastic, but over time labor and resources used in capital and
chemical production can be withdrawn at relatively low cost to non-agricultural use (Gardner,
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treated as such because in the long run the elasticities are very large.  For simplicity, output
demand is represented by a linear inverse demand function with intercept   and slope  . This
specification of the demand function can be viewed as a linear Taylor series approximation for the
true demand function in the neighborhood of the expansion point.
Land supply is specified as a constant elasticity function of the rental rate of land, with 
as the land supply elasticity.  The effect of participation in the ARP is a shift in the supply of land
(Gardner, 1992).  If L is total land supply,   land in use, and   the proportion of land idled in
the ARP, then total land supply is given as  .  The land supply equation with the ARP
is,  .  Following Shortle and Laughland (1995), deficiency payment is modeled as
a per unit subsidy ( ) on output.  Producer price is thus equal to consumer price plus the subsidy.
Environmental damages (D) are represented as a function of excess nitrogen and are
specified as If   is the proportion of nitrogen removed per bushel of corn, and 
represents the proportion of excess nitrogen in runoff, then runoff is given as
(Roth and Jury, 1993).
Net benefit is  consumer plus producer surplus less government transfers and
environmental damages (Freeman, 1993; Just et al., 1992).  Produces surplus in this model is
equal to land rents.  The opportunity cost of land is calculated using the inverse land supply
function adjusted for the ARP.  Government transfers is the net of tax receipts and subsidy
payments. 
Because the net benefit function is highly nonlinear, its expected value cannot be derived
analytically as a function of the policy and exogenous parameters.  A numerical procedure is
therefore used to solve for the endogenous variables for any given set of policy and exogenous(2i)( p i )
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parameter values.  This procedure involves approximating parameter distributions with discrete
points   and associated probability values   - that is, a discrete distribution - using the
Guassian Quadrature approach to numerical integration.
Several steps are used to derive optimal instrument values.  (1) determine the points and
probabilities that approximate the random parameters, (2) combine the parameter points into
parameter sets to create a joint distribution, (3) solve the market model for each parameter set of
the joint distribution for given tax rates and standards and commodity program structure, (4)
calculate net benefit for each parameter set, (5) construct a probability weighted average of
outcomes for each tax rate and standard, and (6) conduct a search for the tax rate or standard that
gives the highest expected net benefit.  This is ex ante, policy that maximizes expected net
benefits.
The value of perfect information contingent on the use of a particular instrument is the
difference between the expected net benefits when instrument is optimized with perfect
information, and the expected net benefits when the instrument is optimized with imperfect
information.  Or in other words, it is the difference between the expected net bebefit of the ex
ante and ex post optimal forms of the instrument.  In addition to the results outlined above,
computation of the value of perfect information requires (1) determining the optimal policy for
every possible realization of the unknown parameters, and (2) computing the expected net
benefits when policies are optimized with perfect information.  Steps (1) - (4) outlined above are
repeated, then a search procedure is used to find the instrument setting that gives the highest net
benefit for a given parameter set.  This is the setting that maximizes ex post, net benefit for a




net benefits.  A probability weighted average is used to calculate expected net benefit ex post.  In
addition to the value of perfect information, we also consider the consequences of perfect
information about subsets of parameters in order to gain insight about their relative importance.
Approximating the Probability Distributions
Calculating the expected value for a continuous variable involves evaluating the integral of
a function over a given range, but with no closed form solutions to the system of equations that
characterize the equilibrium, the net benefit function also has no closed form solution and
therefore the integral (expected net benefits) cannot be evaluated.  If the probability density
functions of the random variables   can be represented by a set of values,   and
probabilities,  , then the integral can be approximated by a probability weighted sum of net
benefits evaluated at the various values of   (Miller and Rice, 1983).  The accuracy of such a
discrete approximation to a continuous distribution obviously depends on it’s ability to preserve
as many moments of the original distribution as possible.
Three methods have been used in the economic literature on choice under uncertainty for
determining discrete approximations.  Direct Expected-Utility Maximization Program (Lambert
and McCarl, 1985),  Direct Expected-Utility Maximization Using Quadrature (Kaylen et al.,
1987) , and Gaussian Quadrature (Preckel and DeVuyst, 1992).  Preckel and DeVuyst show that
the Gaussian Quadrature procedure condenses the approximation to only a few points compared
to the other approaches while preserving the moments of the distribution.  The Gaussian
Quadrature method is used in this study.
Points and probabilities for standardized distributions can be found in Stroud and Secrest7
(1966).  Values for similar distributions with different means and standard deviations can be
obtained by performing the same affine transformations needed to transform the standard
distribution to the desired distribution.  The probability values remain the same.  Like Abler
(1994) two distributions, the uniform and normal are assumed for the random variables.  The
uniform distribution reflects ignorance about the parameter values within the bounded interval, the
distribution is diffuse and not centered.  The normal distribution is used because is a centered
distribution,  not bounded and as such provides a contrast to the uniform distribution.  It can also
be justified by reference to the central limit theorem.  The Guassian Quadrature approximations
for the random variables in this model are presented in Table 1.
Results - Commodity programs
In Table 2 and 3 we present the results for our simulations.  With traditional commodity
programs in place, the expected net benefit from the ex ante optimal tax instruments are slightly
greater than the expected net benefits from the ex ante quantity instruments for both the normal
and uniform distributions, with the expected net benefit from the fertilizer tax being slightly
greater than that of the excess nitrogen tax.  Similarly, the fertilizer standard gives a higher
expected net benefits than the excess nitrogen standard.  The ex post efficiency of the optimized
tax and quantity instruments for each base are virtually the same.  However, the fertilizer
instruments remain more efficient than the excess nitrogen based instruments.  In fact, of the 625
parameter sets in the perfect information case, net benefits from fertilizer tax was greater or equal
to expected net benefits from excess nitrogen tax in all but one case for both the uniform and
normal distributions.8
The ex ante optimal excess nitrogen tax rate is lower than the optimal fertilizer tax for
both the normal and uniform distributions.  Similarly, the shadow price of the ex ante optimal
fertilizer standard is higher than the shadow price of the excess nitrogen standard.  These results
hold for the perfect information case as well.  However, with perfect information, the expected
tax rates (shadow prices) are higher than the ex ante optimal tax rates and shadow prices. 
Accordingly, in this case, uncertainty results in less restrictive policies.
In general, the value of perfect information on all the uncertain parameters for quantity
instruments is about twice that for the tax instruments.  This reflects the fact that the tax
instruments are significantly more efficient than the quantity instruments ex ante but not ex post. 
Comparing either tax instruments or quotas, the value of perfect information is slightly greater
with the fertilizer based instruments.  The value of perfect information is slightly higher with the
uniform approximation than with the normal.  As stated earlier, the uniform distribution is diffuse
and is used to represent greater ignorance about the parameter within a bounded interval.  The
normal distribution on the other hand is more centered.  In effect some information is available in
the normal distribution which could account for the lower value of improved information.
With perfect information on individual parameters, the results indicate that the elasticity of
substitution between fertilizer and land is the most important parameter for the design of nonpoint
pollution policy.  This result is consistent with Hrubovak, LeBlanc and Miranowski (1990) and
Laughland (1995).  Information on the runoff parameter is more valuable if the instrument is
based on excess nitrogen.  In this model, emissions are directly proportional to excess nitrogen. 
Therefore, a better understanding of this parameter should lead to greater efficiency in the design
of excess nitrogen based instruments.  Output demand elasticity is more important for the design9
of fertilizer based instruments.  The least important parameter is land supply elasticity.  With an
inelastic land supply, the change in land supply on an aggregate level is not significant.  It is
possible however that this parameter could become more important with disaggregation.
Results - Without Commodity Programs
Other things equal, eliminating deficiency payments and land set-asides decreases output
and input use.  The cost of the nitrogen pollution falls.  The expected net benefits from the
environmental policies are much more without the commodity programs than with the commodity
programs in place.  Very little increase in expected net benefits is attained with the price
instruments over the competitive equilibrium, while the quantity instruments give essentially no
improvement at all.  The tax rates without the commodity programs are lower than the rates with
commodity programs.  
An interesting result is that, without the commodity programs, the excess nitrogen tax is
more efficient than the fertilizer tax both ex ante and ex post.  This too reflects the effects of
commodity programs.  Because the programs encourage excess production, a benefit of the
environmental policies is to reduce the social costs of the excess production.  In the absence of
the commodity programs, the benefits of the environmental policies are limited to the reduction in
the external costs of nitrate pollution.  We do not report the results here, but the fertilizer tax has
a larger negative impact on production than the excess nitrogen tax.   This is a positive dimension
of the tax when there is excess production under the commodity programs but a negative
dimension when these programs are removed.  This difference in the performance of
environmental policies with and without the commodity is consistent with the theory of second10
best.
The results for the value of information on all uncertain parameters are similar to those
from the case with commodity programs.  The value of perfect information is higher with the
quantity instruments, the elasticity of substitution between land and fertilizer is the most important
parameter in policy design, and land supply elasticity is the least important.  While there is no
value to additional information on all other parameters with respect to quotas, additional
information on output demand is more valuable for fertilizer taxes.  On the other hand, improved
information on land supply elasticity and the runoff coefficient is more valuable in the formulation
of excess nitrogen taxes.
Conclusion
The research indicates that economically efficient nitrate policy choices are sensitive to
commodity programs and uncertainty.  With the commodity programs, the most efficient
instrument is a fertilizer tax.  Without the commodity programs, the preferred policy is an excess
nitrogen tax.  With uncertainty, the taxes on fertilizer or excess nitrogen are more efficient than
quantity controls, but with perfect information the quantity instruments are as efficient as the tax
instruments.  Finally, our analysis suggests that the value of agricultural research is influenced by
the environmental policy choices.  For example, the  elasticity of substitution between land and
fertilizer is more important in the design of fertilizer based instruments while the runoff coefficient
is more important in the design of excess nitrogen instruments.FB
FB ’ sBFLF % (1&sB)FT FLF
FLF~(1,1) log(gd)~(&0.7,0.3) ,~(0.2,0.057) &~(0.6,0.115)
FT s N( J
11
Table 1: Gaussian Quadrature Approximations for Parameters of the Model
UNIFORM NORMAL
Elasticity of Output Land Output Land
Substitution Demand Supply Probabilities Demand Supply Probabilities
( ) Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity
a
Runoff Elasticity of Runoff
Coefficient Substitution Coefficient
0.09 -0.31 0.11 0.42 0.118 0.04 -0.21 0.04 0.27 0.011
0.34 -0.38 0.15 0.49 0.239 0.17 -0.33 0.12 0.44 0.222
0.69* -0.50* 0.20* 0.60* 0.284 0.69* -0.50* 0.20* 0.60* 0.533
1.04 -0.66 0.25 0.71 0.239 1.21 -0.75 0.28 0.76 0.222
1.29 -0.80 0.29 0.78 0.118 1.78 -1.17 0.36 0.93 0.011
*  variable mean;     where   is the Allen Elasticity of Substitution
a
Parameter Distribution: ;  ; ;
Other Parameter Values:  = 0.5;  = 0.21;    = 0.01;  = 0.66;  = 1.5
Table 2: Optimal Tax Rates and Shadow Prices of Standards
Uniform Approximation Normal Approximation
Fertlizer Fertlizer Fertlizer Fertlizer
Tax Standard Tax Standard
Excess Excess Excess Excess
Nitrogen Nitrogen Nitrogen Nitrogen
Tax Stanfard Tax Stanfard
With Commodity Programs
Imperfect Information 0.33 0.28 0.29 0.20 0.35 0.28 0.30 0.22
Perfect Information 0.36 0.36 0.31 0.36 0.36  0.36 0.32  0.36
Without Commodity Programs
Imperfect Information 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.00
Perfect Information 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.1112
Table 3: Expected Net Benefits and Value of Perfect Information for Different Environmental Policies
Uniform Approximation Normal Approximation
Fertilizer Fertlizer Fertilizer Fertlizer
Tax Standard Tax Standard
Excess Excess Excess Excess
Nitrogen Nitrogen Nitrogen Nitrogen




With Uncertainty 16.61 16.56 16.56 16.51 16.70 16.66 16.65 16.60
With Perfect Information 16.68 16.63 16.68  16.63 16.77 16.72 16.77 16.72
Value of Perfect
Information Output Demand Elasticity 0.0091 0.0085 0.020 0.014 0.0089 0.0082 0.019 0.013
($ billion)
All Parameters 0.076 0.072 0.124 0.120 0.067 0.066 0.123 0.120
Elasticity of Substitution 0.064 0.061 0.104 0.104 0.057 0.056 0.105 0.106
Land Supply Elasticity 0.00004 0.00004 0.0001 0.0001 0.00002 0.00003 0.0001 0.0001




With Uncertainty 17.2111 17.2180 17.2043 17.2043 17.3072 17.3092 17.2989 17.2989
With Perfect Information 17.2460 17.2513 17.2460 17.2513 17.3394 17.3431  17.3394 17.3431 
Value of Perfect
Information Output Demand Elasticity 0.0026 0.0020 0.0000 0.0000 0.0026 0.0022 0.0000 0.0000
($ billion)
All Parameters 0.0349 0.0333 0.0417 0.0470 0.0322 0.0339 0.0405 0.0442
Elasticity of Substitution 0.0319 0.0254 0.0403 0.0314 0.0240 0.0222 0.0436 0.0335
Land Supply Elasticity 0.00009 0.00011 0.00 0.00 0.00006 0.00008 0.00 0.00
Runoff Parameter 0.00547 0.00552 0.00 0.00 0.0058 0.0063 0.00 0.0013
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